Former Israeli General’s Microphone Leak Exposes What the October 7th Inquiry Must Discover and What Netanyahu Aims to Conceal

Recordings from Aharon Haliva, the former head of IDF intelligence who stepped down following the events of October 7, reveal him expressing self-blame and pointing fingers at others, highlighting that only a national investigation can reveal the truth, unless Netanyahu remains in power.

August 17th at 05:00 AM August 18th at 06:00 PM

Major General (ret.) Aharon Haliva, who led the Military Intelligence Directorate during the October 7 attack, appeared on Channel 12 TV on Friday night, but was not formally interviewed.

A television channel managed to acquire extended recordings of conversations that Haliva had over the past few months. Those who had previously heard the former intelligence chief were not taken aback. It was still the same Haliva, candid, straightforward, and vocal, seemingly answerable to no one. However, the unique format enabled him to manage the content. He refused to respond to anything he didn’t wish to discuss.

Haliva has previously been characterized as someone who speaks loudly, but on only a few instances was he unable to manage the message he intended to convey. It’s difficult to accept that the words he spoke simply slipped out of his mouth at such an important time.

It’s reasonable to expect that releasing his statements won’t generate widespread public support for the general, who took accountability for his role in the failure by stepping down a year ago. The overall system failed significantly, and people remain upset with Haliva, which is entirely understandable. He is neither a hero nor a martyr. His personality—marked by self-assurance, determination, and frequently disregarding other viewpoints—played a part in the catastrophe.

At the highest levels of Military Intelligence, according to someone who held a senior position, there was for many years a culture of “narcissistic peacocks.” This situation did not begin with Haliva, nor did it conclude when he left, even though some members of the current leadership made genuine attempts to change it.

Nevertheless, there is a significant amount of reasoning behind Haliva’s primary assertion in these recordings: military intelligence, along with the entire Israel Defense Forces, are not the sole entities responsible for what occurred.

When seeking explanations and assigning responsibility for the most significant disaster in the nation’s history, there are four key areas where blame can be distributed: the intelligence failure compared to the operational failure within the IDF; Military Intelligence versus the Shin Bet security agency; the decision-making on that critical night in comparison to the strategies developed in the preceding years, and the accountability of professional levels versus the broader responsibility of political leaders.

Your perspective is shaped by your position, according to Americans. Haliva, although accepting blame, also places it on everyone except himself: the chain of operational command, starting from the IDF’s General Staff to its Southern Command, then to the IDF’s Gaza Division, the Shin Bet, the years when this viewpoint was prevalent, and, of course, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The prime minister was aware of the threats coming from Gaza for many years but downplayed their significance, failing to act despite repeated warnings in the months before the terrorist attack. He implemented a strategy of “divide and rule” concerning the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, intentionally undermining the Palestinian Authority while strengthening Hamas.

Here is a significant distinction: unlike in the IDF, where most of the notable responsible individuals have retired—some due to pressure, others by voluntarily taking responsibility, and still others after a considerable period—there has been no such development within the government and political spheres.

Only in the past few weeks have we witnessed Netanyahu, along with ministers Israel Katz and Bezalel Smotrich, assigning fault to the military while completely disregarding their own role in the catastrophe. This is a remarkable and troubling one-sidedness, which also clarifies why Netanyahu will go to great lengths to block any effort to create a state commission of inquiry. Such a commission will only come into existence if Likud suffers a defeat in the upcoming election.

The Qatar connection

As anticipated, this weekend once again brought news of potential advancements in the discussions regarding a hostage agreement. Mediators Qatar and Egypt have stepped up their efforts, while the U.S. is working to promote an optimistic outlook. A new participant, Turkey, is seeking to leverage its influence over Hamas in a favorable manner. This follows some encouraging developments during a Hamas delegation’s visit to Egypt and an Israeli delegation’s trip to Doha. There is now speculation about the possibility of a limited agreement, following Netanyahu’s shift in position two weeks ago, where he stated that he now only supports a full-scale deal.

One might wish that the origin of the movement signals stems from Hamas recognizing that it has maximized the benefits gained from the hunger crisis in the Gaza Strip and the subsequent global criticism directed at Israel. It makes sense to consider that the group’s leaders are somewhat concerned about the government’s choice to take control of Gaza City, even though there were reservations and resistance from the IDF.

It’s impossible to overlook the timing of the recent leaks, which emerged just before a major strike set for Sunday. This strike highlights the call to free all living hostages and retrieve the bodies held by Hamas, as well as to bring an end to the conflict. As expected, one must observe how Netanyahu, much like he has over the past year and a half, is delaying actions in an effort to prevent a full agreement. It clearly goes against his interests. The pleas from the hostages and their families have no effect on him.

On Thursday, while discussing the conditions of their detention, Netanyahu was quoted as stating that he was unaware of the complex business relationships that three of his advisors had with Qatar, but he did not perceive any issue with such connections if they existed. Qatar, he noted, is not an enemy nation. This is factually accurate, yet it does not obscure the actual essence of this situation. The concerns, as reported, involve advisors who have been working for Netanyahu and Qatar simultaneously during the ongoing conflict.

Were the advisors required to have a conflict-of-interest agreement that either allowed or banned this type of work? Furthermore, at this point, it was evident to all what Qatar’s role had been in funding Hamas while simultaneously engaging in mediation efforts, which creates an inherent conflict of interest concerning the Israeli party.

Netanyahu’s effort to defend his advisors is not persuasive, regardless of the perspective, particularly considering reports that they launched a campaign supporting Qatar during the conflict, seeking to damage Egypt’s reputation as a mediator in the eyes of the Israeli population.